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634 r37 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 21390. In Bank Atl~. 10, 1951.J 
RALPH CLINTON BOREN. Appellant. v. STATE PER-
SONNEL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA et a1., Respond-
ents. 
[1] Civil Service - Dismissal- Judicial Remedies. - An ordinary 
civil action is inappropriate to annul an order of the State Per-
sonnel Board dismissing plaintiff from his civil service position 
and to recover salary accruing from the date of dismissal. 
[2] Administrative Law-Court Review of Administrative Action 
-Remedies.-Since the enactment of Code Civ. Proc., §1094.5, 
the writ of mandamus is appropriate for the purpose of in-
quiring into the validity of any final administrative order or 
decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law 
a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be 
taken and discretion in the determination of facts is invested 
in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board ot officer. 
[3] Civil Service - Dismissal - Judicial Remedies - Mandamus. 
-Proceedings before the State Personnel Board in connection 
with the dismissal of a civil service employee are of the type 
envisioned by Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, and mandamus will 
lie to review t.he board's decision. (See Gov. Code, § 19570 et 
seq.) 
[4] ld.-Dismissal.,.-Judicial Remedies-Certiorari.-Since the jur-
isdiction of the State Personnel Board, including its ad,iudicat-
mg power, is derived directly from the Constitution (art. 
XXIV, § 3a), certiorari is available to review the board's 
decision dismissing an employee from his civil service position. 
(See Code Civ. Proe., §§ 1068,1074.) 
[5] ld.-Dismissal-Judicial Remedies-Pleading.-Against a gen-
eral demurrer, it is unimportant that plaintiff's pleading to 
annul an order of the State Personnel Board dismissing him 
and t.o recover salary accruing from the date of dismissal is 
not in the form of a petition for mandamus or certiorari, if a 
cause of action for mandamus or certiorari "as been stated. 
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 452,580,1109.) 
[lJ See 5 Cal.Jur. 143; 10 Am.Jur. 935. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,3-5,10,12, 21-23J Civil Service, § 13; 
[2J Administrative Law, § 19; [6,9, 15J Civil Service, § 9; [7] State 
of California. §51; [8, 11J Civil Service, §12; [13J Pleading, 
§ 84; [14] Contracts, § 263; [16,17] Civil Service, ~ 1; [18] Civil 
Service, § 7.1; [19] Estoppel, § 44; [20J Agency, § 63. 
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16) Id.-Dismissal-Jurisdiction of Board. _. In view of Con st., 
art. XXIV, §§ 2tc), 3(a), 5(a), the dismissal of an employee 
from his civil service position is within the jurisdiction of the 
State Personnel Board. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5(b) i see, also, 
Gov. Code, § 1957(' et seq.) 
[7] State of California-Contracts.-The very nature of a contract 
with the state makes impossible an interpretation or enforce-
ment of it that is in the strictest sense "disinterested"; some 
officer, agency, or court of the state itself must ultimately 
decide what are the state's rights and obligations; protection 
to those who deal with the state is provided, not by referring 
controversies to third parties, but by electing and appointini 
conscientious officials and judges. 
[8] Civil Service-Dismissal-Hearing.-There is no unfairness in 
the fact that a civil service employee's rights of tenure have 
been decided in the first instance at u hearing before the same 
public agency with which he dealt at the time of his appoint-
ment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5(b).) 
[9] Id.-Dismissal-Autbority of Board.-State employment is ac-
cepted subject to statutory provisions regulating such matters 
as salary, working conditions, and tenure, and a civil service 
employee is presumed to know when he joins the service that 
the State Personnel Board is charged by law with deciding all 
questions of dismissal. (Const., arLXXIV; Gov. Code, § 19570 
et1seq.) 
[10] Id.-Dismissal-Judicial Remedies-Pleading.-In an action 
to annul an order of the State Personnel Board dismissing 
plaintiff from his civil service position and to recover salary 
accruing from the date of dismissal, plaintiff failed to allege 
facts that establish a denial of a fair trial, where he made no 
claim that any member of the State Personnel Board was 
prejudiced against him, and the board was a proper tribunal. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5(b).) 
[11] Id.-Dismissal-Hearing.-Under certain conditions, the fail-
ure of the State Personnel Board to consider a proper defense 
set up by the party charged or to make findings thereon might 
constitute a failure to proceed "in the manner required by law" 
and therefore an abuse of discretion under Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1094.5. (See Gov. Code, §§ 19578, 19582.) 
[12a. 12b] Id.-Dismissal-Judicial Remedies-Pleading.-In an 
action to annul an order of the State Personnel Board dismis-
sing plaintiff from his civil service position, no abuse of dis-
cretion (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) is indicated by an allegatiun 
that the board ignored plaintiff's defense that his contract of 
employment limited his services to Southern California and 
[6J See 5 Cal.Jur.148j 10 Am.Jur. 931. 
I 
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that he was justified in refusing to report for duty at Sacra-
mento, where, in view of Gov. Code, § 19360, giving the power 
of transfer to his superior, had such findings been made they 
would not support the conclusion tha,t his employment was 
conditional and his refusal justified. 
[13] Pleading-Demurrer as Ad:nission.-A demurrer assumes the 
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 
[14] Contraets-Pleading.-A contract may ordinarily be pleaded 
by its legal e1Iect. 
[15] Civil Service-Dismissal-Authority of Board.-Since the au-
thority of the State Personnel Board is go\'erned by the 
Constitution and by the Civil Service Act (Gov. Code, § 18500 
et seq.), both of which are the subject of judicial notice (Code 
Civ. Proe., § 1875 (2), (3), the scope of that authority is a 
question of law and may properly be considered on demurrer. 
[16J Id.-Statutory Regulation.-The terms and conditions of civil 
service employment are fixed by statute and not by contract. 
[17] Id.-Statutory Regulation.-The statutory provisions control-
ling the terms and conditions of civil {ervice employment 
cannot be circumvented by purported contracts in conflict 
therewith. 
[18] Id.-Transfers.-No geographical limitation is placed on the 
broad power granted by Gov. Code, J 19360, to transfer a civil 
service employee from one job in the state to another. (See, 
also, Gov. Code, §§ 18006, 19361.) 
(19] Estoppel-Against Public.-The authority of a public officer 
cannot be expanded by estoppel. 
[20J Agency-Ostensible Authority-Basis of Doctrine.-The doe-
trines of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel are not based 
on the representations of the agent but on the representations 
of the principal. 
[21] Civil Service -Dismissal- Judicial Remedies - Pleading.-
Where the complaint in an action to annul an order of the State 
Personnel Board dismissing plaintiff from his civil service posi-
tion states that the board made findings, without setting them 
forth even in substance, it must be assumed, in the absence of 
a contrary allegation, that the board's decision is supported 
by the findings and that the findings are supported by the 
evidence. 
(22] Id. - Dismissal- Judicial Remedies - Mandamus. - Where 
plaintiff, in an action to annul an order of the State Personnel 
Board dismissing him from his civil service position, fails to 
bring his allegations within the provisions of Code Civ. Proe., 
§ 1094.5, be fails to state a cause of action for relief by writ 
of mandamus. 
Aug. 1951] BOREN 1). STATE PERSONNEL BOARD 
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[23) Id.-Dismissal- Judicial Remedies - Certiorari.-Sinee the 
scope of review by certiorari is at least as limited as that by 
mandamus, plaintifi who fails to state a cause of action ill 
mandamus to annul an order of the State Personnel Board 
dismissing him from his civil service position likewise fails to 
state a cause of action in certiorari. (Code Civ. Proe., § 1074.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. William B. McKesson, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to annul order of State Personnel Board dismissing 
employee from civil service position. Judgment of dismissal 
on sustaining demurrer to second amended complaint with-
out leave to amend, affirmed. 
George E. Cryer and R. Alston Jones for Appellant. 
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys Gen-
eral, Howard C. Goldin and Bayard Rhone, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J .-This appeal is on the judgment roll from 
a judgment of dismissal entered on an order sustaining a 
demjurrer to plaintiff's second amended complaint without 
leave to amend. 
[1] The complaint in form is simply a complaint in a 
civil action. Plaintiff seeks to annul an order of defendant 
State Personnel Board dismissing him from his civil service 
position and also seeks a judgment awarding him the salary 
accruing thereto from the date of his suspension. For this 
relief, an ordinary civil action is inappropriate. (See Tenth 
Biennial Report of the Judicial Council of California, 133-145.) 
[2] Since the enactment of section 1094.5 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, it is no longer open to question that in this 
state the writ of mandamus is appropriate "for the purpose 
of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order 
or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by 
law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to 
be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested 
in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board or officer .... " 
[3] The proceedings of the State Personnel Board in con-
nection with plaintiff's dismissal were clearly of the type 
envisioned by section 1094.5 (see Gov. Code, § 19750 et seq.), 
and the writ of mandamus will therefore 1ie to review the 
board's decision. [4] Since the jurisdiction of the State Per-
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sonnel Board, including its adjudicating po\ver, is derivlld 
directly from the Constitution (art. XXIV, § 3a j cf. Oovl"rt 
v. State Board of Equalization, 29 Ca1.2d 125, 131-132 [173 
P.2d 545]), the writ of certiorari is also available to review 
the board's decisions. (O'Brien v. Olson, 42 Cal.App.2d 449, 
453-457,460 [109 P.2d 8]; Code Ci .... Proc., §§ 1068, 1074.) 
[5] As against a general demurrer, however, it is unim-
portant that plaintiff's pleading was not in form a petition 
for mandamus or certiorari. All that is required is that plain-
tiff state facts entitling him to some type of relief, and if a 
cause of action for mandamus or certiorari has been stated, 
the general demurrer should have been overruled. (Grain v. 
Aldrich, 38 Cal. 514, 520 r 99 Am.Dec. 423] : Brown v. Ander-
son-Oottonwood Irr. Dis!., 183 Cal. 186, 188 [190 P. 797); 
Estate of Brown, 196 Cal. 114, 125-126 [236 P. 1441; In re. 
01'iy and Oounty of San Francisco. 195 Cal. 426, 429 [233 
P. 965); In re Oaliform:a Toll Bridge A.1dhority, 2]2 Cal. 
298, 309 [298 P. 485] ; Board of Trustees v. State.- Board of 
EquaUzation, 1 Ca1.2d 784, 787 [37 P.2d 84. 96 A.L.R. 775) : 
Traders Oredit Oorp. v. Superior Oourt, 111 Cal.App. 663. 667 
[296 P. 99] ; Husband v. Superior Court, 128 Cal.App. 444, 
448 [17 P.2d 764); Code Civ. Proc., §§ 452,580,1109.) 
Even if the second amended complaint is regarded as a 
petition for a writ of mandamus or certiorari, it fails to allege 
any facts that would justify granting the relief sought. 
Review of an administrative order by means of mandamus-. 
is governed by section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
which provides: ". . . (b) The inquiry in such a case shall 
extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded 
without or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there was a fail' 
trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of dis .. 
cretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent. 
has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order 
or decision is not support~d by the findings, or the finding'F. 
are not supported by the evinence." 
Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that establish any lack 
or excess of jurisdiction. [6] Sections 2(c), 3(a), and 5(a) 
of article XXIV of the Constitution vest the State Personnel 
Board with jurisdiction over all dismissals, demotions, and 
suspensions in the state civil service. (See"also, Gov. Code, 
§ 19570 et seq.) The order dismissing plaintiff from his civil 
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With respect to the rClluir(!ment that he be accorded a fair 
trial, plaintiff contends that the State Persollnel Board was a 
party to his contract of employment and is therefore unable 
to render an unprejudiced decision concerning it. [7] The 
vl~ry nature of a contract with the state, however, makes 
impossible an interpretation or enforcement of it that is, in 
the strictest sense, ., disinterested' '-some officer,. agency, or 
court of the state itself must ultimately decide what are the 
state's rights and obligations. Protection to those who deal 
with the state is provided, not by referring controversies to 
third parties, but by electing and appointing conscientious 
officials and judges. To obtain responsible control over state 
employment the civil service system was established by the 
people. (Const., art XXIV.) The power to discipline em-
ployees was largely transferred from various officials and 
departments to the State Personnel Board. It was contem-
plated, furthermore, tllat civil service should be under the 
board's supervision, to the end that an personnel matters 
be expertly and uniformly administered. [8] There is no un-
fairness, therefore, in the fact that plaintiff's rights have 
been decided in the first instance by the same public agency 
with which he dealt lit the time of his appointment. The 
position of the State Personnel Board in this respect is not 
unlike that of the Board of Medical Examiners and other 
licensing agencies that supervise the granting of licenses, the 
scope of the activities permitted thereunder, and, when nE'CE'S-
8ary, the disciplining of licensees. (See Dare· v. Board of 
Medical Examiners, 21 Cal.2d 790 [136 P.2d 304]; Webster 
v. Board of Dental Examiners, 17 Ca1.2d 534 [110 P.2d 992] : 
Covert v. State Board of EqualizaNon, 29 Ca1.2d 125[173 
P.2d 545]; O'Brien v. Olson, 42 Cal.App.2d 449 [l09 P.2d 
8].) [9] Moreover, state employment is accepted subject to 
statutory provisions regulating such matters as salary, work-
ing conditions. and tenure (Oaliform'a v. Broth.erhood of 
Railroad Trainmen, ante, pp. 412, 417 [232 P.2d 857]: 
Risley v. Board of Oim, Service Oommrs., 60 Cal.App.2d 32, 
36-39 [140 P.2d 167]), and plaintiff is presumed to have 
known when he joined the civil senice that the State Per-
sonnel Board is charged by Jaw with deciding all questions 
of dismissal. (Const .. art XXTV: Gov. Code. § 19570 et seq.) 
[10] The State Personnel Board was therefore a proper 
tribunal, and, since there iR no claim that any member of the 
board was prejudiced against plaintiff, it must be concluded 
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that he has failed to allege facts that would establish the 
denial of a fair trial. 
Although the complaint does not expressly allege an abuse 
of discretion within the meaning of section 1094.5, plaintiff'. 
principal contention is to that effect. 
It is alleged, in substance, that by reason of the representa-
tions of the State Personnel Board and the terms of plaintiff's 
acceptance of the offer of employment, it was a condition of 
his contract that he would not be required to serve outside 
the Southern California area; that he was ordered by his 
superior to report for duty at Sacramento, which is not in 
Southern California; that he refused to obey this order on 
the ground that it was contrary to his contract; that the 
charges before the State Personnel Board were based on this 
refusal; that his answer to the charges set up this condition 
of his contract; that the State Personnel Board "made no 
findings as to the location at which plaintiff had been appointed 
to serve, or as to the condition upon which he had accepted 
appointment to his position, . . . and said State Personnel 
Board declined to attach any significance to the conditional 
nature of plaintiff's employment; and said board entirely 
ignored plaintiff's defense that his contract of employment._ 
. . . justified his failure to obey the order of his superior to 
report for duty at Sacramento." 
[11] Under certain conditions, the failure of the board to . 
consider a proper defense set up by the party charged or 
to make findings thereon might constitute a failure to proceed 
"in the manner required by law" and therefore an abuse 
of discretion under section 1094.5. (See Gov. Code, §§ 19578, 
19582; cf. Webster v. Board of Dental Examiners, 17 Cal.2d 
534,543 [110 P.2d 992J.) [12a] In this case, however, even had 
the board made findings in accord with plaintiff's allegations 
of fact, such findings would not support the conclusion that 
his employment was conditional in nature and that the con-
dition justified his refusal to report for duty at Sacramento. 
[13,14] It is true that a demurrer assumes the truth of the 
facts alleged in the complaint, and it is also true that a 
contract may ordinarily be pleaded by its legal effect. Im-
plicit in plaintiff's allegations, however, is the claim that the 
State Personnel Board had authority to promise on behalf 
of the state that plaintiff would not be required to serve else-
where than in Southern California. [15] Since the board's 
authority is governed by the Constitution and by the Civil 
Service Act (Gov. Code, § 18500 et seq.), both of which are the 
) 
) 
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subject to judicial notice (Code Civ. Proc., § 1875 (2), (3», 
the scope of that authority is a question of law and may 
properly be considered on demurrer. (Branham v. The Mayor 
etc. of San Jose, 24 Cal. 585, 602; see, also, Ohm v. San Fran-
cisco, 92 Cal. 437, 449-450 [28 P. 580] ; Callahan v. Broderick, 
124 Cal. 80, 83 [56 P. 782].) 
[16] The terms and conditions of civil service employment 
are fixed by statute and not by contract. (California v. 
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, ante, pp. 412, 41'1 
[232 P.2d 857] ; Risley v. Board of Civil Service Commr,., 
60 Cal.App.2d 32, 36 [140 P.2d 167]; Nutter v. City of Santa 
Monica, 74 Cal.App.2d 292, 298 [168 P.2d 741] ; City of Lo, 
Angeles v. Lo, Angeles etc. Council, 94 Cal.App.2d36, 44 
[210 P.2d 305]; see Neuwald v. Brock, 12 Cal.2d 662, 668 
[86 P.2d 1047]; 14 Cal.L.Rev. 326.) "When an employee 
of the state, under civil service, accepts a position, he 
does so with knowledge of the fact that his salary, and, indeed, 
his conduct, are both subject to the law governing such 
matters, as set forth in the statute and the rules and regula-
tions of the commission." (Raymond v. Christian, 24 Cal . 
.App.2d 92, 100 [74 P.2d 536] ; see, also, Stephens v. Clark, 
16 Cal.2d 490, 493 [106 P·.2d 874].) [17] The statutory pro-
visiQns controlling the terinS and conditions of civil service 
employment cannot be circumvented by purported contracts 
in codict therewith. It is therefore unnecessary to determine 
whether the postal card questionnaire filled out by plaintiff 
when he applied for state employment set forth the conditions 
of a contract, as he contends, or was merely a request for 
information, as defendants contend. The controlling question 
is whether the statutory provisions governing employment in 
the state civil service gave to plaintiff's superior the authority 
to transfer him from Los Angeles to Sacramento. 
Section 19360 of the Government Code provides: U An 
appointing power may at any time transfer any employee 
under his jurisdiction from one position to another in the 
same class or in another class having substantially similar 
duties, responsibilities, and qualifications, and substantially 
the same salary range. In every such case the appointing 
power shall give written notice of his action to the board, ac-
cording to board rule." 
[18] Plaintiff contends that this section does not authorize 
the transfer of an employee, over his objection, to 8 place not 
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word "position" in the section refers to the kind of work 
and not to a geographical position or place. Even if it is 
conceded that "position" is equivalent to employment for 
particular work, no geographical limitation is placed upon 
the broad power granted to transfer an employee from one 
job in the state to another. (See Spaletta v. Kelly, 30 Cal. 
App.2d 656, 659-660 [86 P.2d 1074J; cf. Mitchell v. Board 
of Trustees of Visalia Union High School Dist., 5 Cal.App.2d 
64, 69 [42 P.2d 397].) Had the Legislature intended such a 
limitation, it could easily have been provided for, just as 
limitations as to duties, responsibilities, qualifications, and 
salary range were provided for. Moreover, the statute ex-
pressly applies to any employee and makes no exception of 
employees claiming under special contracts such as that al-
leged here. 
The conclusion that section 19360 granted to plaintiff's 
superior the authority to transfer him to Sacramento is re-
inforced by the interpretation that the }legislature itself 
has given the statute. The section immediately following 
(§ 19361) provides: "If a transfer is protested to the board 
by an employee as made for the purpose of harassing or dis-
ciplining him, the appointing power may require the employee 
to transfer pending approval or disapproval of the transfer 
by the board. If the board disapproves the transfer, the em-
ployee shall be returned to his former position, shall be paid 
the regular travel allowance for the period of time he was 
away from his original headquarters, and his moving costs both 
from and back to the original headquarters shall be paid in 
accordance with Board of Control rules." "[A] transfer" 
in section 19361 obviously refers to a transfer pursuant to 
section 19360, and section 19361 clearly recognizes that such 
a transfer may involve a cbange from one geographical loca-
tion to another. Further evidence of tbe Legislature's pur-
pose may be found in section 18006 of the Government Code 
(formerly Pol. Code, § 352.5) ; that statute provides: "When-
ever a state officer, agent or employee is required by the ap-
pointing power to change bis place of residence necessitating 
tbe moving of his household effects, such officer, agent or em-
ployee shall receive his actual moving expenses not to exceed 
four hundred dollars ($400), and the Board of Control may 
adopt general rules and regulations covering the payment of 
such ~:xpenses." The implication is obvious that a geographi-
cal transfer may be required. 
It should be observed that tbere is no allegation by plain-
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tifT that thc order that he report for duty at Sacramento was 
made to harass or discipline him. The present case is there-
fore to be distinguished from the recent decision of this court 
in Buckman v. Board of Supervisors, ante, pp. 305, 307 l231 
P.2d 496]. 
Plaintiff contends that even if the State Personnel Board 
was without authority to make a contract limiting the geo-
graphical area of plaintiff's service, the state is nevertheless 
estopped by the board's representations. To involte estoppel in 
cases like the present would have the effect of granting to the 
state's agents the power to bind the state merely by repre· 
senting that they have the power to do so. [19] It is accord-
ingly held that the authority of a public officer cannot be ex-
panded by estoppel. (County of San Diego v. California 
Water etc. Co., 30 Ca1.2d 817,825.830 {186 P.2d 124] ; Wheeler 
v. City of Santa Ana, 81 Cal.App.2d 811,817 [185 P.2d 373J; 
Branham v. The Mayor etc. of San Jose, 24 Cal. 585, 604; 
Raisch v. City and County of San P"ancisco, 80 Cal. 1, 6 {22 
P. 22] ; Gardella v. County of Amador, 164 Cal. 555, 564 [129 
P. 993] ; Foxen v. City of Santa Barbara, 166 Cal. 77, 81-83 
{134 P. 1142] ; Von Schmidt v. Widber, 105 Cal. 151, 157 {38 
P. 682] ; Sacramento etc. Dist. v. Rt1ey, 194 Cal. 624, 638 [229 
P. 95~] ; see, also, 10 Cal.Jur. § 28, p. 652; 7 A.L.R. 1248, 1249; 
cf. Lukens v. Nye, 156 Cal. 498, 505-506 [105 P. 593]; City 
of Arcata v. Green, 156 Cal. 759-764-765 (106 P. 86].) 
[20] Even in the field of private contracts, the doctrines of 
ostensible agency or agency by estoppel are not based upon the 
representations of the agent but upon the representations of 
the principal. (Ernst v. Searle, 218 Cal. 233, 237 [22 P.2d 
715] ; Hill v. Citizens National Trust & Savings Bank, 9 Ca1.2d 
172,176 [69 P.2d 853] ; Civ. Code, § 2317; see, also, Hobart v. 
Hobart Estate Co., 26 Ca1.2d 412, 452 [159 P.2d 958] ; Pacific 
Ready-Cut Homes v. Seeber, 205 Cal. 690, 694 [272 P. 579] ; 
Hams v. San Diego Flume Co., 87 Cal. 526, 528 [25 P. 758] ; 
1 Cal.Jur. §§ 33-45, pp. 731-747 [especially §§ 39, 41].) 
[12b] Here the state, as principal, did not represent that the 
board could limit plaintiff's service to Southern California, 
but on the contrary enacted and published section 19360 of 
the Government Code, which gives the power of transfer to 
plaintiff's superior. 
It must be concluded that no abuse of discretion is indicated 
by the 'allegation that the board ignored plaintiff's claimed 
contractual defense and made no findings thereon. [21] More-
over, the complaint states that the board did make find· 
I 
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ings, although they are not set forth, even in substance. Un-
der these circumstances, it must be assumed, in the absence 
of a contrary allegation, that the decision is supported by the 
findings and that the findings are supported by the evidence. 
[22] Having failed to bring his allegations within the 
provisions of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for relief by writ 
of mandamus. [23] Inasmuch as the scope of review by cer-
tiorari is at least as limited as that by mandamus (see Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1074), it follows that plaintiff has likewise failed 
to state a cause of action in certiorari. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter. J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied September 
7,1951. 
